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Abstract 
In the current study, 126 undergraduate students read a case summary describing an 
armed robbery of a convenience store, involving one eyewitness, and then viewed one of 
five brief videotapes of an eyewitness identification procedure. Confidence ratings were 
manipulated as 80% v. 100%: Type of explanation offered for changes in confidence 
consisted of social, memory-based or none. Results indicated increased perceptions of 
eyewitnesses were associated with confidence consistency, rather than type of 
explanation. Perhaps providing any explanation for changes in confidence drew attention 
to the inconsistency and magnified its effect on perceptions. Further, when the eyewitness 
provided one estimate of confidence, participants perceived them as more credible 
compared to confidence inflation condition. Implications for these results at trial are 
discussed.  
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I Can Explain! 
Understanding Perceptions of Eyewitnesses as a Function of  
Type of Explanation and Inconsistent Confidence Statements 
Eyewitness misidentifications have been recorded as the leading cause of 
wrongful convictions (www.innocenceproject.org.). In more than 75% of the wrongful 
convictions exonerated by DNA evidence, mistaken eyewitness identifications played a 
major role. This finding provides powerful support of the connection between mistaken 
identification and erroneous convictions. Researchers, however, estimate that the number 
of innocent defendants convicted through faulty eyewitness evidence is much higher than 
the number of exonerations, with as many as 4,500 wrongful convictions per year (Cutler 
& Penrod, 1995). Despite the results of research demonstrating problems with lineups 
and efforts to remedy the situation, currently utilized methods of eyewitness 
identification continue to be linked to wrongful convictions, through mistaken 
identification. 
Law enforcement officials, who investigate crimes and collect eyewitness 
evidence, play a key role in cases involving mistaken eyewitness identifications, and as 
such, their perceptions are vital to our understanding of this important issue. Kebbel and 
Milne (1998) conducted a survey assessing police perceptions of eyewitnesses in the 
United Kingdom. Officers reported that eyewitnesses typically provide them with their 
primary leads in a case. Additionally, officers responded that eyewitnesses are rarely 
inaccurate in their identifications and believe that an eyewitness’ identification 
confidence, typically gauged by the witness’ response time, indicates their accuracy. 
Detectives also reported using eyewitness evidence to provide them with or to confirm 
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suspects when conducting criminal investigations. This research shows us that a positive 
identification of a suspect by an eyewitness is sometimes used as the only piece of 
evidence against a criminal defendant at trial. As a result, in an attempt to combat the 
powerful influences of eyewitness testimony at trial, the defense may call an eyewitness 
evidence expert to testify about the reliability of eyewitness identifications (Leippe, 
1995). Thus, it is vital that eyewitness identification evidence is collected by law 
enforcement in a precise manner. 
Researchers report that experts do not always agree on the utility of eyewitness 
confidence as a predictor of eyewitness accuracy (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 
2001).  In this study, 47 of 64 eyewitness experts surveyed, indicated that they would be 
willing to testify on the poor predictive ability of confidence with respect to accuracy. 
Further, 51 indicated they would testify that confidence is influenced by variables other 
than accuracy (e.g., confirming feedback provided by police after a positive 
identification).  The gap that exists between expert opinions and the intuitive beliefs of 
law enforcement regarding eyewitness confidence and accuracy, reinforces the 
importance of this area for researchers examining eyewitness identification (Schmechel, 
O'Toole, Easterly, & Loftus, 2006). 
 The relation between eyewitness confidence and eyewitness accuracy has been 
widely researched (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995).  Results of numerous studies 
have led eyewitness researchers to agree that the confidence-accuracy relationship is 
weakly correlated (Deffenbacher, 1980; Leippe, 1980). Despite the empirical findings 
converging on this weak relation, law enforcement remain heavily reliant on eyewitness 
confidence to gauge the accuracy of any particular identification.   
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The importance of research in eyewitness identification extends to specific types 
of lineups and the procedures associated with them. In particular, researchers examining 
the relation between eyewitnesses who select from a line-up (choosers) vs. those who do 
not (non-choosers), report a weak correlation between eyewitness confidence and 
identification accuracy (Sporer et al., 1995). Although Sporer and colleagues advocate for 
separating choosers from non-choosers in empirical studies, non-choosers play a limited 
role in the legal system. In other words in a real world setting, it is rare for an individual 
to view a lineup and not provide a subsequent identification. However, in spite of the 
restricted empirical significance of this research, judicial decision-makers carefully 
consider its relevance in legal decisions pertaining to eyewitnesses (Clark, Howell, & 
Davey, 2008).  
 Critics of eyewitness research argue that many laboratory studies examining the 
role of memory in forming identifications have limited ecological validity (Egeth, 1993; 
Konecni & Ebbesen, 1986; Yuille, 1993).  In response to this criticism, Behrman and 
Richards (2005) compared archival results with experimental results in a unique two-
experiment study.  In the first study, they examined 183 police cases with eyewitness 
identifications involving 424 photo arrays and 37 live line-up situations.  Line-up records 
were analyzed for statements of confidence, non-hesitant choosers and witnesses who 
used a process of elimination.  They found that the best predictor of a suspect 
identification (as opposed to a line-up filler) was quick responding. In addition, verbal 
confidence – statements of positivity and/or sureness - was found to be a strong predictor 
of suspect identification. In fact, only 2.5% of choosers selected a foil with a high degree 
of confidence. However, researchers have expressed caution when interpreting these data. 
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Specifically, the limited control of extraneous variables in archival data, biased line-ups, 
and the possibility that the suspect was not present in the line-up, are all factors that 
should be taken into account when considering ecological validity.   
In a second study, Behrman and Richards evaluated these factors through 
observation (response time) and a post-identification questionnaire.  The results closely 
mirrored their archival study, finding a stronger relationship between confidence and 
potential accuracy in field settings. Namely, if eyewitness confidence and identification 
accuracy are related for choosers, then collecting eyewitness post-identification 
confidence in an accurate and consistent manner is critical. These procedures have been 
recognized by many federal and state law enforcement agencies that now obtain a 
confidence rating immediately following an identification (Technical Working Group for 
Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). These results have promising implications considering the 
heavy reliance of law enforcement on eyewitness confidence (Kebbel & Milne, 1998). 
 Although the research on confidence and accuracy is mixed, it is important to 
understand the implications of a positive identification for law enforcement. In a recent 
meta-analysis, Clark, Howell and Davey (2008), uncovered five patterns of identification 
responses and their implications.  They reviewed 94 experiments to determine the 
diagnostic value of different eyewitness’ responses after viewing a line-up.  The 
categories of these responses included: suspect identification in both target-absent and 
target-present line-ups, foil identification, “I don’t know” statements, or statements of 
rejection of the line-up. Howell and Davey concluded that suspect identifications in non-
biased line-ups were diagnostic of a suspect’s guilt. A non-biased lineup is defined as one 
that is properly instructed and fillers are chosen based on witness description.  These 
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results indicate that under appropriate conditions, an eyewitness identification is 
potentially indicative of a suspect’s guilt in a court of law.  However, the utility of this 
evidence disappears with improper selection of fillers or biased line-up instructions. 
Thus, biased line-up procedures may not only affect the diagnosticity of the identification 
but the eyewitness’ post-identification confidence as well.   
 When a lineup is presented to an eyewitness, the resulting influence on 
identification accuracy has been found to be problematic (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 
2002; Luus & Wells, 1994).  Although base rates and initial encoding are important, it is 
important to test whether certain techniques can improve an eyewitness’ memory.  
Perfect, et al. (2008) conducted five experiments on the effect of an eyewitness closing 
their eyes while recalling the details of a witnessed event. The researchers believed that 
closing one’s eyes aids individuals in remembering details.  They developed this belief 
from previous research on the cognitive interview, an interviewing technique designed to 
aid investigators when questioning a witness (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 
1985). During live or videotaped witnessing conditions, participants were asked to recall 
various details of the viewed crime (i.e., how many people were in the room), through 
either cued or free recall.  The effect of eye-closing was dramatic, with significant 
increases in the amount and accuracy of details recalled.  This effect was shown for free-
recall and cued recall and both visual and auditory information.  Further, the results were 
replicated with several sets of stimulus materials, i.e., videotaped events, live events, 
pertinent information and incidental information. These results show promise of the 
development of techniques used to increase eyewitness recall.  Increasing the accuracy or 
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number of details that an eyewitness recalls is likely to lead to an increase in the 
confidence in their identification.  
Eyewitness identification can also be influenced by social factors; namely 
conformity – a well-established concept in social psychology literature (Luus & Wells, 
1994).  Studies of conformity reveal that the social pressures evident with a desire to “fit 
in”, result in conforming to group norms. This result is often revealed despite the 
presence of alternative and obvious information (Asch, 1951; Beloff, 1958; Walker & 
Andrade, 1996).  In his seminal work, Solomon Asch revealed that in a group setting, 
when faced with a choice between the need to be right and the need to be liked, 
individuals chose the latter even when obvious information contradicted the group. 
Stanley Milgram (1963) established a similar result when examining individuals’ 
obedience to authority, another factor that may play a role in eyewitness identifications. 
In Milgram’s classic obedience study, the experimenter insisted that individuals provide 
shocks up to 450 volts to individuals posing as confederates who responded incorrectly 
on a word pair task.  A similar dynamic exists in the social situation of eyewitness 
identification. Namely, the eyewitness is put in a social situation with potential pressures 
to conform and obey an authority figure, i.e., police officer.  Researchers have found that 
in an attempt to obey the authority figure, pressure to choose a suspect increases, in turn, 
increasing the number of false identifications (Malpass & Devine, 1981; Steblay, Hosch, 
Culhane, & McWethy, 2006). An officer, or co-witness has the potential to reinforce 
confidence in erroneous identifications by providing the eyewitness with confirming 
feedback; e.g., That’s who we thought it was.  The resulting effects are drastic and 
provide evidence of the role of social influence on changes in confidence statements, as 
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well as the identification itself (Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004; Wells & Bradfield, 
1999).   
Confirming feedback is a type of social influence present during lineup 
procedures capable of affecting eyewitness identification (Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 
2004). Confirming feedback is typically offered to an eyewitness following an 
identification. Semmler, Brewer, and Wells (2004) had participants watch a videotaped 
robbery, and then identify a suspect through a computerized photo array.  After making 
an identification, some participants were told by the experimenter that another witness 
had identified the same suspect as them.  After the feedback or a filler task, participants 
were asked to provide a retrospective estimate of confidence at the time of the ID as well 
as a current estimate of confidence.  Results showed that confirming feedback caused 
confidence to become inflated for all participants in the feedback condition, regardless of 
accuracy or presence of actual suspect.  In another study, designed to investigate the 
effects of police feedback on eyewitness memory, Bradfield, Wells and Olson (2002) had 
participants view a video of a simulated crime and make a subsequent identification in a 
six-person videotaped lineup.  They found that participants given post-identification 
feedback by the lineup administrator in the form of: “Good you identified the actual 
suspect”, reported increased confidence, better viewing conditions, and increased 
attention to the crimes.  Further, their results indicated that confidence inflation was 
moderated by the accuracy of the witness, showing greater confidence inflation for 
inaccurate witnesses. Similar, research has shown that confirming feedback after an 
identification distorted other aspects of eyewitness recollections as well, such as reporting 
a better view, paying more attention, remembering more details, and identifying the 
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suspect with ease (Wells & Bradfield, 1999; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003).  Thus, 
confirming feedback following an identification is particularly troublesome because it not 
only has a robust effect on confidence estimates but may influence eyewitness’ 
perceptions of other forensically relevant variables as well. 
Confidence malleability, or the probability of an eyewitness to change his/her 
confidence, occurs not only with confirming feedback but with disconfirming feedback as 
well.  Luus and Wells (1994) conducted a staged theft study in which pairs of participants 
witnessed a live event.  The witnesses were then separated before making an 
identification.  In the initial identification, witnesses chose the member of the lineup they 
believed was the perpetrator.  After the identification, participants were given feedback 
regarding the other witness’ identification. The feedback consisted of whether or not 
additional witnesses chose the same suspect. The campus police then videotaped these 
witnesses while making a second identification that included an estimate of confidence.  
Results showed that witnesses in the confirming feedback condition had higher 
identification confidence ratings than controls.  In contrast, witnesses in the 
disconfirming feedback condition had lower identification confidence ratings compared 
to participants in the no feedback condition. In a second study (Luus & Wells, 1994), the 
videotaped identifications were then shown to another group of participants who rated 
each witness with respect to accuracy, believability, etc.  Participants rated the more 
confident witnesses as more accurate and believed these eyewitnesses had a better view, 
were more persuasive, and gave better descriptions, despite not having access to this 
additional information. This finding implies that confidence, despite extraneous 
influences, has a notable influence on an observer. In a legal sense, observer can be 
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defined as presiding judge and/or jury. In a separate study, Wells and colleagues (2003) 
were unable replicate the disconfirming feedback effect showing that although 
disconfirming feedback has the potential to decrease confidence, it is not clear which 
variables control this effect.  One could argue that increasing or decreasing a witness’ 
confidence does not change the results of an identification, and is therefore of minimal 
importance, but if a lineup is conducted fairly, namely without biasing feedback, 
confidence will not be improperly inflated.  These studies have important implications for 
police practices and can be implemented relatively easily due to law enforcement’s 
control of both lineup administration and control (Wells, 1978).  The fact the eyewitness 
confidence is malleable may be minimally concerning if an eyewitness is able to correct 
for external influences. 
Brewer, Keast, and Rishworth (2002) examined the effects of eyewitness 
reflection and post-identification disconfirmation reflection on the confidence-accuracy 
relation.  Eyewitness reflection is defined as reflecting on or thinking about the 
identification/witnessing conditions; post-identification disconfirmation reflection 
involves thinking about why, as an eyewitness, you may be incorrect in your evaluation 
of identification/witnessing conditions. In the eyewitness reflection condition, 
participants completed a survey that instructed them to think about various witnessing 
conditions, i.e. “How much attention did you pay to the persons face?”  The 
disconfirmation reflection survey included questions designed to have participants 
question their choice, i.e., “List as many reasons as you can as to why the person you 
picked may not actually be the thief.”  Participants completed the survey with questions 
aimed at disconfirming or reflecting on their identification, after the identification and 
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then provided a confidence estimate between 0-100%.  The confidence-accuracy 
relationship for both experimental groups (those who either reflected or were provided 
with disconfirming reflection) had stronger confidence-accuracy correlations than 
participants in the control group (no feedback).  Participants in the reflection and 
disconfirmation conditions had more accurate identifications for higher levels of 
confidence.  Thus, witnesses who are instructed to actively reflect upon their 
identification may provide more precise confidence estimates.  Kassin (1985) reported a 
similar finding with eyewitnesses who watched a videotape of themselves identifying the 
suspect before giving a confidence estimate. One explanation for the self-reflection 
phenomenon may be that it stimulates a memory-based process that influences an 
eyewitness’ confidence-accuracy relationship. These findings indicated that eyewitness 
confidence is easily influenced and may be improved through self-reflection (Perfect, et. 
al., 2008). Further, if the confidence-accuracy relationship for any given witness is 
increased, then his/her testimony may be more likely to reflect the actual guilt of a 
suspect.  Comparing varying estimates of confidence inflation has become an important 
area of eyewitness research (Charman & Wells, 2008).  
One question researchers have tested is whether informing the eyewitness of 
potential confidence inflators would enable them to self-correct their confidence prior to 
trial?  Charman and Wells (2008) examined an eyewitness’ ability to estimate the impact 
of confirming feedback or cautionary instructions on their confidence, following an 
identification.  Interestingly, they found that those who received confirming feedback 
were able to accurately estimate the influence of that feedback.  However, participants 
who did not receive confirming feedback overestimated the influence that any confirming 
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feedback would have had on their confidence.  The implications of this finding could be 
quite considerable if eyewitness identifications are videotaped to document evidence.  
Jurors, who are shown the eyewitness identification video at trial, may overestimate the 
influences they perceive to have changed a witness’ confidence level; e.g., the suspect 
stood out in the lineup and that is why he/she chose him so confidently.  Charman and 
Wells concluded that witnesses are able to correctly identify influencing variables, but do 
not always accurately estimate the amount of influence.  If factors influencing the 
eyewitness’ identification confidence are submitted as evidence in a trial, it has important 
implications for forming a jury’s perception of eyewitness credibility.   
In response to the numerous erroneous convictions due to mistaken 
identifications, a Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence released a report in 
1999 that established guidelines for law enforcement officials regarding the ideal way to 
gather eyewitness evidence.  One of the recommendations was to obtain a confidence 
statement immediately following the witnesses’ identification.  Although the courts and 
law enforcement often rely on confidence estimates, research reviewed above has shown 
that eyewitness confidence is fraught with complications, many in the form of 
malleability, sensitivity to instructions, etc..  Despite the numerous pitfalls, eyewitness 
confidence remains a significant factor that prosecutors, judges and jurors use as an index 
of witness credibility (Schmechel et al., 2006).   
In Neil v. Biggers (1972), the United States Supreme Court ruled that there should 
be five criteria governing the credibility of eyewitness testimony.  These factors were 
developed by the court to assist the trier of fact in weighing eyewitness evidence.  The 
five factors included were viewing conditions of the suspect during the crime, including 
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time viewed, lighting etc., attentiveness of the witness during the crime, the accuracy of 
the witness’ initial description of the suspect, the confidence of the witness at 
identification and the elapsed time between identification and the crime.  If the witness is 
deemed credible by these criteria, then his/her testimony would be admissible.  
In order to test how potential jurors integrate the five Biggers criteria to estimate 
witness accuracy, Bradfield and Wells (2000) examined Kaplan’s (1982) summative 
hypothesis.  The summative hypothesis assumes that each of the five criteria would be 
weighed individually by jurors and then added separately in the jurors’ conclusions about 
the eyewitness. Thus, an eyewitness with a good view who was confident would be 
perceived as more accurate than a confident witness without a good view. Participants 
read a trial transcript in which an eyewitness provided testimony regarding their 
confidence in their identification, their viewing conditions and their attentiveness during 
the crime. In response to the prosecutor’s query about the identification, eyewitness 
confidence was manipulated in the transcript from “I’m positive” to “I’m not really sure.” 
The results demonstrated support for the summative hypothesis showing main effects for 
each manipulated criteria. Confidence, attention, viewing conditions, accuracy of the 
witness’ initial description, and the elapsed time between identification and the crime 
each had a significant effect on the participants’ ratings of witness accuracy and witness 
believability (Bradfield & Wells, 2000).  If jurors do in fact, sum the information 
presented to them, then changes in confidence would have an independent effect from 
explanations and no interaction would be detected.  If jurors are summing these criteria 
without an understanding of the potential pitfalls of eyewitness evidence, then erroneous 
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convictions are more likely to occur.  The average person and potential juror’s knowledge 
regarding eyewitness evidence is vital in translating this body of research.  
The potential juror’s knowledge of eyewitness evidence is similar to that of law 
enforcement’s knowledge previously reviewed. Noon and Hollin (1987) conducted a 
survey evaluating law students’ knowledge of eyewitness evidence. Half of the 
participants agreed that an eyewitness was able to accurately identify a face after one year 
and one exposure. The remaining participants (51%) correctly recognized that after 2 
weeks, memory for the once seen face drops off to a negligible level. Additionally, 79% 
of participants reported that confidence was a moderate to strong predictor of accuracy 
despite difficult viewing conditions. The idea that confident witnesses are accurate 
appears to be well documented and is found among lawyers, judges, law enforcement and 
potential jurors (Schmechel, et al., 2006). Arguably, potential jurors should possess 
similar beliefs to the participants surveyed above. This has important implications if the 
eyewitness has been provided with additional information from police or a co-witness. 
When or if this is the case, eyewitness confidence is likely to change by the time they 
testify at trial. The impending result is the jury’s unawareness of  the artificial inflation of 
confidence by feedback or other variables. The eyewitness, having been coached by the 
prosecutor, would appear confident at trial, and the jury would likely perceive this 
confidence as an indication of accuracy, potentially leading to an increase in erroneous 
convictions. 
Berman, Narby, and Cutler (1995) studied inconsistent testimony – a potentially 
influential variable on perceptions of an eyewitness. They found that participant-jurors 
were more likely to believe and render a guilty verdict for witnesses who provide 
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consistent testimony. Brewer and Burke (2002) manipulated eyewitness testimony and 
the appearance of confidence in an audiotaped trial experiment. These researchers found 
that inconsistent confident eyewitnesses were rated as more believable than a consistent 
witness who did not appear confident. One limitation to this research however, is the 
operational definition of confidence used in this study. Specifically, the researchers 
manipulated confidence by having less confident witnesses appear hesitant. This may not 
be consistent with actual eyewitnesses due to opportunities to rehearsed testimony prior 
to trial and therefore provide an inflated confidence estimate at trial.    
Wells, Lindsay, and Ferguson (1979) examined the influence of an eyewitness’ 
self-rated confidence at trial on jurors’ perceptions of the eyewitness. The eyewitnesses 
viewed a staged crime, made an identification, rated their confidence on a 9-point scale 
and then testified live in front of participant jurors. Jurors rated confident eyewitnesses as 
being highly accurate regardless of actual accuracy. In this study, both inaccurate and 
accurate witnesses testified. Cutler, Penrod, and Stuve (1988), manipulated ten legally 
relevant witnessing conditions and found eyewitness confidence to be the only significant 
predictor of verdict.  Fifty-four percent of the participant-jurors convicted the defendant 
after viewing an eyewitness who stated he was 100% confident.  In contrast, conviction 
rate dropped to 39% when the eyewitness stated he was 80% confident.  Although 
identification accuracy has no noticeable effect on jurors’ perceptions of witness 
credibility, witness’ identification confidence has been found to increase perceived 
credibility by researchers examining the effect of identification accuracy (Lindsay, Wells, 
& O'Connor, 1989).  With similar results, a drastic increase in confidence – from unsure 
at lineup to positive at trial – was studied simultaneously with the effect of cross-
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examination on juror perceptions (Bradfield & McQuiston, 2004). This research indicated 
that the evidence of extreme confidence inflation increased defense-favorable attitudes; 
i.e., more not guilty verdicts. An important caveat however, is the unlikelihood that a 
witness will testify if they are unsure at the time of identification.  
 Jones, Williams and Brewer (2008) conducted a study to determine if obtaining a 
post-identification confidence estimate would mediate the deleterious effects of 
confidence inflation of eyewitnesses.  In the first study, they provided trial transcripts to 
participant-jurors depicting an eyewitness whose confidence inflated from 60% to 99% 
confident. After providing an in-court estimate of 99% confidence during direct 
examination, it was revealed during cross-examination that the witness was only 60% 
confident post-identification. This inflation was either challenged questioning, “Why are 
you more confident now?” or merely stating by the defense attorney during cross-
examination. They found that participant-jurors rated inflated witnesses as less credible, 
less accurate and more inconsistent.  However, despite statistical significance, 
participants’ scaled scores narrowly fluctuated.  After analyzing responses to two open-
ended items regarding how participant-jurors interpreted the eyewitness inconsistency, 
the researchers concluded three distinct eyewitness attributions: (a) prosecutorial strategy, 
(b) memory contamination and (c) confidence epiphany. The confidence epiphany group 
rated the eyewitness as more credible and accurate than jurors in the other two groups. In 
fact, their estimates mirrored the control group’s credibility estimates.   
In the second study, the researchers varied the eyewitness’ response to an inquiry 
about her confidence inflation to determine if causal explanations for the confidence 
change effected jurors’ perceptions.  Responses were varied as strategy based – “I want 
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people to believe me, I want someone to be held accountable for what happened to me”; 
memory contamination – “Well, I have been rehearsing my testimony and have become 
more confident with each rehearsal”; or confidence epiphany – “I was nervous at the 
identification but now I am confident and have recalled more details”. Consistent with the 
findings from the first study, participant-jurors rated the eyewitness as less credible and 
accurate if they attributed the inflation to a strategy or memory contamination. If an 
eyewitness were to have a confidence epiphany prior to trial, then jurors believed the 
witness and were more likely to convict the defendant. Although it is still unclear exactly 
how jurors weigh eyewitness evidence, this body of research lends itself to some tentative 
conclusions.  First, a confidence epiphany by an eyewitness, or remembering more details 
and becoming more confident on his/her own, is likely to be perceived as more credible 
than a confidence inflation due to rehearsing or strategy.  Second, jurors perceive 
consistent testimony as more believable and accurate. 
Research in the field of eyewitness evidence provides ideas about ways in which 
jurors may interpret eyewitness evidence.  Specifically, the summative hypothesis 
assumes that jurors will sum the information provided to them at trial regarding 
eyewitness credibility (Kaplan, 1982).  In addition, confirming feedback has been shown 
to inflate an eyewitness’ confidence estimate following an identification (Bradfield et al., 
2002; Luus & Wells, 1994; Semmler et al., 2004). This inflated confidence estimate 
when presented during trial may influence perceptions of the eyewitness and subsequent 
identification as well.  Potential jurors may perceive confidence inflation due to a 
memory-based process as an inconsistency in an eyewitness’ statement.  Jurors perceive 
eyewitnesses who provided inconsistent statements as less accurate (Berman & Cutler, 
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1996; Berman et al., 1995).  It would follow then that people may perceive eyewitnesses 
whose confidence inflates due to social factors as more accurate.  This is in direct 
opposition to research findings that demonstrate confidence inflation due to confirming 
feedback does not reflect accuracy (Bradfield, et al., 2002; Wells & Bradfield, 1999).   
Research on eyewitness confidence has presented it as an unstable characteristic 
(Luus & Wells, 1994; Semmler, et al., 2004; Wells, et al., 2003). Namely, the relation 
between confirming feedback and confidence estimates have the potential to affect 
eyewitness’ beliefs regarding other legally relevant variables (Bradfield, et al., 2002; 
Luus & Wells, 1994; Wells, et al., 1979). Although disconfirming feedback has the 
potential to decrease confidence, it is not clear which variables control this effect.  
Drastic eyewitness confidence changes have been shown to be perceived negatively by 
participant-jurors (Bradfield & McQuiston, 2004; Bradfield & Wells, 2000).  It is not 
clear, however, how minor changes in eyewitness confidence would interact with an 
explanation for this change and subsequently influence jurors’ perceptions. In order for 
an eyewitness to testify at trial, his or her confidence estimate would have to be quite 
high; i.e., 80% or above. When an eyewitness presents a confidence rating that has been 
artificially inflated, it remains unknown to the jury.  This is problematic because if jurors 
are relying on confidence to assess the eyewitness’ accuracy, then the confidence rating 
provided by the eyewitness at trial is misleading.   
 One safeguard designed to protect defendants from presenting inflated confidence 
estimates to jurors is written into the best practices lineup recommendations currently 
used in New Jersey and North Carolina. These recommendations require the eyewitness 
to provide in their own words, their confidence immediately following the identification.  
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If inconsistencies regarding a witness’ confidence are highlighted during cross-
examination, it benefits researchers to assess the impact of this inconsistency and how 
varying explanations by the eyewitness concerning the discrepancies in confidence 
estimates. Confidence estimates may be influenced by numerous variables, which may 
increase or decrease witness’ confidence.  For example, confirming or disconfirming 
feedback has the potential to influence an eyewitness’ confidence rating (Luus & Wells, 
1994; Wells & Bradfield, 1999). The confidence change could also be the result of a 
memory-based process of self-reflection, which has been shown to increase the 
confidence-accuracy relationship (Brewer, et al., 2002).  Although at trial a witness may 
explain his/her changes in confidence, the impact of the explanation needs further 
examination. This study will attempt to isolate two factors that may potentially increase 
or decrease confidence estimates: memory and social influences (Bradfield, et al., 2002; 
Brewer, et al., 2002; Semmler, et al., 2004).  Utilizing videotaped confidence 
identifications, participants viewed an eyewitness provide an explanation for their slight 
confidence increase. To our knowledge, this is the first study assessing the impact of 
social versus memory-based explanations for eyewitness confidence changes on their 
perceived credibility.  In addition, this research will advance an understanding of how a 
confidence increase by an eyewitness is perceived.   
The present study is a one-way between subjects design examining perceptions of 
three explanations (Memory-based vs. Socially-Influenced vs. None) following an 
increase in a witness’ confidence. Participants were exposed to 1 of 5 conditions: Social 
Explanation, Memory-Based Explanation, No Explanation, High-No Rating, and  No 
Rating-Low Confidence. Increasing confidence in our explanation conditions was defined 
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as 80% post-identification to 100% follow-up confidence. In addition, two other control 
conditions were examined, an 80% post-identification confidence only condition, defined 
as No Rating-Low; and a 100% follow-up confidence only condition, defined as High-No 
Rating.  Perceptions of the eyewitness will change as a function of explanation, with a 
memory-based explanation predicted to be perceived as the most credible, accurate, 
consistent, etc., followed by No Explanation and a socially-influenced explanation 
respectively.  Mere confidence inflation (No Explanation condition) will be perceived as 
less credible, accurate, consistent, etc than control conditions with no inflation (High-No 
Rating and No Rating-Low).  In addition, perceptions of the eyewitness, perceived 
fairness of the identification and relation to law enforcement will predict the perceived 
overall accuracy of the identification.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology, political science and 
history courses from a Northeast Liberal Arts University.  They received extra credit for 
their participation. Participants were 126 (63 males, 63 females) students ranging in age 
from 18-44 years old.  The participants were 88% European American participants, 2.4% 
Hispanic participants, 2.4% Asian participants and 7.1% other ethnicity participants.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five experimental conditions. 
Materials 
 Videotape. A summary was created describing an armed robbery of a convenience 
store, involving one eyewitness (the store clerk). A five-minute videotaped presentation 
was developed using an actor and a police detective.  A 25-year-old female graduate 
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student portrayed the eyewitness.  A detective from a Northeast law enforcement agency 
portrayed the detective in the video.  The detective took the eyewitness through a typical 
eyewitness identification procedure involving a photo array lineup displayed sequentially, 
in which the eyewitness identifies a suspect.  After the identification, the eyewitness 
provided a confidence rating of 80% or no confidence rating.  In the next scene, which 
was identified in subtitles as two weeks later, the eyewitness returns to the police station 
for a second interview.  The detective welcomes the eyewitness back and reviews her 
earlier identification interview.  The detective asks typical questions about the crime, 
which remains constant over each manipulation.  In the Low Initial confidence condition, 
the detective does not query about the eyewitness’ confidence in interview two.  In the 
other four conditions, the detective asks how confident the eyewitness is today about her 
identification during questioning.  In the High Latter Confidence condition, the 
eyewitness provides a confidence rating of 100% in interview two in contrast to no 
confidence rating in interview one.  In the Social-Influence, Memorial-Based and No 
explanation conditions, the eyewitness provides a confidence rating of 100% that 
represents an increase from interview one.   A follow-up question was then presented by 
the detective (Why did your confidence change?), for which the eyewitness gave a 
Socially Influenced explanation, a Memory-Based explanation, or none at all (in this 
condition the follow up question was not be asked).  In the Socially-Influenced 
Explanation condition participants see the eyewitness respond to the detectives query 
“Why did your confidence change?” in the second interview, by stating “Well after I 
picked the guy out, you guys (the police) gave me the feeling that I picked out the right 
person.” In the Memory-Based Explanation condition participants view the eyewitness 
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justify the confidence change by stating “I thought about it when I got home.  I 
remembered exactly what her nose looked like, and I knew that was the girl I picked out.”  
In the No Explanation Condition participants saw the eyewitness change his/her 
confidence but were not exposed to any follow-up questions.   
Post-Videotape Instrument. After viewing the videotape, participants were asked 
about their perceptions of the eyewitness. A seven-point Likert-type scale was used to 
assess the participants’ perceptions, from 0 (not at all accurate/consistent/trustworthy, 
etc.) to 6 (very accurate/consistent/trustworthy, etc.). Several questions addressed the 
confidence changes of the eyewitness and served as manipulation checks.  Participants 
then completed several demographic questions.  See Appendix A for the informed 
consent, Appendix B for the questionnaire, and Appendix C for HSRB approval. 
Procedure 
  After obtaining informed consent, participants read a summary describing the 
crime.  After reading the summary, participants watched one of five video presentations 
depicting two interviews between the police detective and the eyewitness. The first 
interview consisted of a detective presenting the eyewitness with a photo array lineup. 
Immediately following the first interview, participants were shown the second interview, 
identified as occurring two weeks later by subtitles, depicting the eyewitness giving an 
increase in their confidence, a 100% confidence rating or no confidence rating to the 
detective. A social explanation, a memory-based explanation, or no explanation followed 
this confidence rating.  After viewing one of the five video presentations participants 
completed the questionnaire.  The questionnaire contained questions regarding their 
perceptions of the eyewitness, the identification and finally demographic information.  
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Perceptions of the eyewitness addressed were confidence levels, credibility, 
trustworthiness and reliability.   Participants were thanked for their participation and 
debriefed as to their nature of our study. 
Results 
Manipulation Check  
 In order to assess participants’ awareness of our manipulations, a 3 X 3 
crosstabulation was conducted on our experimental conditions. Of the 77 participants in 
the Confidence Inflation conditions, 73 (95%) correctly identified the first eyewitness 
confidence rating as 80%, 74 correctly identified the second eyewitness confidence rating 
of 100%.  In addition, 22 of 26 (85%) correctly identified the 80% confidence rating in 
the Low-No Rating condition, and 16 of 23 (70%) correctly identified the 100% 
confidence rating in the No Rating-High condition.  Of 125 participants, 104 (83%) 
correctly identified that two weeks had passed between the consecutive interviews.   
Hypothesis Tests 
 Hypothesis I. A one-way analysis of variance was performed to investigate the 
type of eyewitness explanation offered on perceptions of the eyewitness.  The seven 
dependent variables analyzed included: credibility, honesty, consistency, accuracy, 
confusion, likeability and trustworthiness.  Items were scored on a 7-point Likert-type 
scale from 0 = Not at all credible/honest, etc. to 6 = Very credible/honest etc. The three 
levels of explanation included: Social, Memory-Based, or None.  There were no 
significant effects of type of explanation offered on any of the dependent variables. 
 Collapsed Conditions.  Due to the lack of significant effects of our explanation 
manipulation, data were collapsed across the three explanation conditions.  Remaining 
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analyses were conducted on three levels of the independent variable, Confidence Inflation 
(Inflation, Low No-Rating, and No Rating-High conditions).     
 Hypothesis II.   Hypotheses II was examined with respect to perceptions of the 
eyewitness as a function of confidence ratings.  A one-way analysis of variance was 
conducted on the seven items addressing perceptions of the eyewitness.  A significant 
effect was found for four of the seven items.  For credibility: F (2, 123) = 3.84, p = .024; 
ηp
2
 = .06, for consistency: F (2, 123) = 26.74, p < .001; ηp2 =  .30, for accuracy: F (2, 
123) = 6.88, p = .001; ηp2 = .10, for confusion: F (2, 123) = 6.42, p = .002; ηp2 = .09.  See 
Table 1 for Mean Differences.   
 Hypothesis III.  Hypothesis III was examined to determine the predictive ability 
of perceptions of the eyewitness on the accuracy of the identification.  Other predictor 
variables included: perceptions of fairness of the identifications, and self-reported 
association with law enforcement.  Perceptions of the eyewitness scale, consisting of 7 
items, possessed good internal consistency, with a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .87.  
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of these factors on the 
likelihood that participants would rate the eyewitness identification as accurate.  The 
model contained three independent variables (Perceptions of the eyewitness scaled score 
dichotomized into High and Low, perceptions of the fairness of the identification, and 
relation to law enforcement).  The full model containing all predictors was statistically 
significant, χ2 (3, N = 126) = 30.7, p < .001, indicating that the model was able to 
distinguish between participants who perceived the identification as accurate and 
inaccurate.  The model as a whole explained between 21.8% (Cox and Snell R square) 
and 30.3% (Nagelkerke R-squared) of the variance in perceived accuracy, and correctly 
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classified 68.8% of cases.  As shown in Table 2, only one of the independent variables 
made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model.  The strongest predictor 
of rating the eyewitness identification as accurate was the Perceptions of the Eyewitness 
scaled score, recording an odds ratio of 8.61.  This indicated that participants who rated 
the eyewitness positively were over 8 times more likely to rate the eyewitness 
identification as accurate than participants who rated the eyewitness negatively, 
controlling for all other factors in the model.    
Discussion 
 Eyewitness evidence has been an increasingly popular topic in legal psychology 
over the last 30 years.  Law enforcement often relies heavily on eyewitness 
identifications, the strength of which is typically judged by the eyewitness’ self-rated 
confidence. Despite questionable validity, the criminal justice system uses this evidence 
at trial as long as it meets criteria outlined by the U.S. Supreme court in Neil v. Biggers 
(1972).  Confidence estimates can be gathered prior to the identification, at the time of 
identification, at a follow-up interview and at trial. Evidence has shown that confidence is 
quite malleable, and can be affected by several factors.  Feedback, whether confirming, 
disconfirming, delayed or immediate can increase or decrease confidence.  In addition, 
research has shown that confidence has an effect on jurors’ perceptions of eyewitness 
credibility and witnessing conditions (Bradfield & McQuiston, 2004; Bradfield & Wells, 
2000; Berman, et al., 1995).  This research sought to begin to understand the effect that a 
change in confidence followed by an explanation would have on jurors’ perceptions of 
eyewitness credibility.  
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 Inconsistent with our hypotheses perceptions of the eyewitness did not change 
according to type of explanation given.  There were no significant differences found 
among the three experimental conditions.  This is inconsistent with the research of Jones, 
et al. (2008), who reported significant differences on perceived accuracy and credibility 
for a confidence inflation from 60% to 99% accompanied by a Confidence Epiphany, a 
Memory Contamination, or a Strategy based explanation.  It is possible that we did not 
find effects due to the smaller magnitude of our confidence inflation, however this was 
important for ecological validity.  Witnesses presenting inconsistent confidence 
statements (the confidence inflation conditions) were perceived as less accurate, less 
consistent, less credible and more confused than participants in the No Rating-High 
condition, which only provided a single confidence statement.  This is in line with 
previous research demonstrating that inconsistent testimony is perceived as less accurate, 
etc. (Berman, et al., 1995). If law enforcement is collecting post-identification 
confidence, this could prove useful to the defense when confidence inflates at trial.  It 
appears that any explanation for this inconsistency does little to nullify the 
inconsistency’s effect on perceptions of the eyewitness.  However, these results will need 
to be replicated before any broad conclusions can be made.  Interestingly, participants 
perceptions in the Low-No Rating condition did not significantly differ from those in the 
Inflation condition (the inconsistent conditions), except for perceptions of consistency.  
An eyewitness’ confidence rating of 80% was seen just as accurate and credible as that of 
an inflated, inconsistent rating of 80% to 100%.  If this result were replicated, this would 
mean that a witness whose confidence is inflated by coaching will not be discredited by a 
previous confidence statement that was presented provided that it was 80% or above.  
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Whether these results will replicate to verbal judgments of confidence, I’m pretty sure to 
I’m positive, remains to be seen and is an area of potential future investigation. 
 Consistent with the findings of Jones, et al. (2008), the logistic regression 
revealed that Perceptions of the eyewitness dichotomized scaled score significantly 
predicted the perceived overall accuracy of the witness’ identification.  Jones and 
colleagues found that participants in the Confidence Epiphany condition who rated the 
eyewitness as more accurate and credible were also more likely to convict.  This implies 
that it is the perceptions of the eyewitness that is driving their credibility, perceived 
accuracy of their identification and ultimately their likelihood to convict based on this 
evidence.  In fact, Perceptions of the eyewitness scale was the only significant contributor 
to our model.  Although, perceived fairness of the identification did not contribute to the 
model this may be due to ceiling effects.  If unfair identification procedures are utilized in 
future research, this may emerge as a significant predictor of perceived identification 
accuracy as well. 
 During manipulation checks, we discovered that participants in the control 
conditions did not accurately identify the eyewitness’ confidence.  When no confidence 
rating was given, the vast majority of participants reported a confidence rating despite the 
not applicable option.  This finding may be because jurors are assigning confidence 
ratings to the witness even when none is given.  If this hypothesis is correct, then 
obtaining post-identification confidence becomes an important piece of evidence.  This 
finding warrants further study, as future research could evaluate if and/or when jurors are 
assigning confidence estimates to eyewitnesses.  In addition, future research should 
examine the confidence inconsistency effect using trial simulation methods and examine 
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whether the effect of confidence changes are moderated by other possible explanations.   
Although this research provides some evidence, replicating these results with other 
eyewitnesses (i.e., a male) will provide validation.  In our sample of participants, 
European Americans were overrepresented when compared to the population of potential 
jurors.  Lastly, although confidence was isolated during consecutive interviews for the 
purposes of this study, this design has limited ecological validity.  This limitation is 
easily rectified by utilizing trial simulation methods in future research.     
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Table 1. Mean Ratings of the Eyewitness 
 Condition     
Inflation High-No Rating No Rating-Low  
_______________________________________________________________ 
Eyewitness Perceptions    
Accuracy 3.35a 4.30b 3.81ab 
Confusion 3.16a 2.00b 2.5ab 
Consistency 2.74a  4.83b  4.00c 
Credibility 3.57a 4.35b 3.73ab 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly at p < .05.
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Predicting Perceived Accuracy of Witness Identification 
 B S.E. Wald df Odds Ratio 
Perceptions of the Eyewitness1 2.15 .47 21.38 1 8.61 
Perceived Fairness of Identification -.21 .17 1.58 1 .21 
Relation to Law Enforcement -.33 .44 .57 1 .72 
________________________________________________________________________  
Note. 1 Responses dichotomized as High/Low: significant predictor at p < .001. 
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Appendix A 
Informed Consent 
 
I freely and voluntarily consent to be a participant in this research project entitled 
“Mock Juror Perceptions of Eyewitness Confidence Malleability and Differential 
Explanations” I understand that I will be one of 240 individuals participating in this 
project.  My participation is expected to last approximately 30 minutes. 
 I understand that the purpose of this research is to enhance the knowledge of 
eyewitness testimony.  Participants will read and complete the survey anonymously after 
viewing a short video presentation.   
 I understand that there are no known risks involved in my participation.  I 
understand by attending today I will receive extra credit in my core class.  I have been 
told that my responses will be strictly anonymous; my records will be coded with a 
number and my name will not appear on any of the forms. 
 I understand that I may withdraw my consent and discontinue participation in this 
research project at any time with no negative consequences.  I have been given the right 
to ask questions concerning the procedure, and any questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. 
 If I desire further information about this research project I may contact Dr. Garret 
Berman at (401) 254-3341  or Dr. Don Whitworth at (401) 254-3509.  I have been 
offered a copy of this informed consent.  I have read and understand the above. 
 
_______________________________                  Date______________________ 
Participant’s Name (Print Name) 
 
_______________________________                  Date______________________ 
Participant’s signature 
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Appendix B 
 
Please be sure to answer every question on this 
questionnaire by filling in the circle that corresponds to the 
appropriate response. 
Please take a few minutes to fill out this survey, you will be asked to fill out demographic 
information and questions regarding the videotape that was just viewed.  Thank you for 
your time. 
Questions about the videotape: 
1. How credible did you find Mindy to be? 
       
0  
Not at all 
Credible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Very 
Credible 
2. How honest did you find Mindy to be? 
       
0  
Not at all 
Honest 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
Very Honest 
3. How consistent did you find Mindy to be? 
       
0  
Not at all 
Consistent 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
Very 
Consistent 
4. How accurate did you find Mindy to be? 
       
0  
Not at all 
Accurate 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
Very 
Accurate 
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5. How confused did you find Mindy to be? 
       
0 
 Not at all 
Confused 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
Very 
Confused 
6. How likeable did you find Mindy to be? 
       
0 
 Not at all 
Likeable 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
Very Likeable 
7. How trustworthy did you find Mindy to be? 
       
0  
Not at all 
Trustworthy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Very 
Trustworthy 
8. The identification procedures employed by the detective were fair: 
       
0  
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
Strongly 
agree 
9. How would you evaluate the eyewitness identification in this case: (choose 
one) 
  
Accurate  Inaccurate 
10. How important was Mindy’s confidence from the first interview in evaluating 
the accuracy of her identification? 
       
0  
Not Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
Very 
Important  
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11. How important was Mindy’s confidence from the second interview in evaluating 
the accuracy of her identification? 
       
0  
Not Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
Very 
Important 
12. How confident was Mindy during the identification procedure? 
      
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%    Unknown 
13. How confident was Mindy during the follow-up interview with the detective? 
      
20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Unknown 
14. How much time had passed between the first and follow-up interviews? 
     
1 day 1 week 2 weeks 1 month 1 year 
15. Circle the percentage that you believe best reflects Mindy’s identification 
accuracy: 
     
20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
16. If this case goes to trial, rate the likelihood that you would convict the 
defendant based upon the eyewitnesses memory 
       
0  
Not Very 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
Very 
Likely 
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Demographic Information 
17. Your gender 
  
Male                     Female
18. Into which of these age categories do you fall: 
      
17-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 & Older 
19. Which of the following best characterizes your background: 
     
White, Non-
Hispanic 
Hispanic Black, Non-
Hispanic 
Asian  Other 
20. Your Marital Status: 
      
Single Married Re-married Separated Divorced and 
Single 
Widowed 
21. Your current political preference: (not necessarily your registration) 
    
Democrat Republican Independent Other 
22. Aside from your political affiliation, how would you evaluate your political 
views: 
    
Liberal Slightly Liberal Slightly 
Conservative 
Conservative 
23. Do you have a valid Driver’s License: 
  
No Yes 
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24. Have you ever served on a jury in a civil case: 
  
No Yes 
25. What is your occupation: 
      
Not working/ 
unemployed 
Student Employed part-
time 
Employed full-
time  
Retired Other 
26. Are you either a close friend of, or related to, any law enforcement officer: 
(including retired police officers) 
  
No Yes 
27. What is the highest level of education you have attained: 
      
Grade school Some high 
school 
High school 
diploma 
Some college 
junior college 
College degree Post-graduate 
college degree 
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Appendix C 
Mock Juror Perceptions of Eyewitness Confidence Malleability and Differential 
Explanations 
Principal Investigator:  Melissa Paiva, BA       Graduate Student, Forensic Psychology 
Supervisor:                    Garret Berman, PhD.        CAS, Psychology Department 
Co-investigator:             Ryan Weipert                 Graduate Student, Forensic Psychology 
 
1. Project Description:  The goal of this research study is to examine how jurors might 
perceive an eyewitness to a crime that has identified a suspect.  If the eyewitness 
confidence level changes prior to trial, it is not clear how jurors will interpret that 
information.  This study will present participants with a video presentation of an 
eyewitness identifying a suspect and then changing their confidence about their 
identification in a subsequent interview.  The eyewitness will give either a plausible 
reason for changing their confidence or a reason that was unfairly influenced by 
information obtained after the identification.  Each participant will see an eyewitness 
either increasing or decreasing their confidence and either giving a plausible or tainted 
reason.  The participants will then be asked to complete a questionnaire assessing the 
credibility of the eyewitness.   
 
2. Participants:  Participants will be recruited from undergraduate core classes at Roger 
Williams University. 
 
3. Research Procedures and Methodology: Participants will be given informed consent 
to review before participating in the study.  Participants will watch the video presentation 
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(See Appendix A for a transcript) and complete a questionnaire (See Appendix B) in a 
vacant classroom.  Questionnaires will be collected by researchers for analysis.  Analysis 
will be conducted utilizing ANOVA in SPSS.  Participants will be debriefed regarding 
the purposes of the study.  The researchers do not anticipate any negative affects of 
participation.  Participants will be offered extra credit in their corresponding core class 
for their time.  
 
4. Consent Procedures:  Informed consent will include a standardized consent form (See 
Appendix C) in accordance with APA guidelines.  Participants will be given informed 
consent prior to participation.   
 
5. Data Confidentiality: Participants will be asked to complete demographic information 
on their questionnaires.  Their questionnaires will be numbered in order to ensure 
anonymity.  
 
6. Risks/Discomforts to the Participants:  The researchers do not anticipate any risks or 
discomforts to the participants.  Participants will be debriefed as to the purposes of the 
study. 
 
7. Benefits of the Study: The benefit of this study will be to promote the understanding 
of how changes in confidence are perceived by potential jurors. 
Signatures: 
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__________________________   __________________________ 
      Principal Investigator     Supervisor 
__________________________ 
           Co-Investigator 
